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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LOUIE E. SIMS, 
Pet i t ioner/Appellant, 
v. 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 900324 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF PETITIONER 
POINT I 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
APPLIES TO ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Appellee asserts a three part argument to support its 
contention that the exclusionary rule does not apply to illegal 
drug stamp tax proceedings. Appellee argues first that the 
proceedings are civil in nature; second, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to civil proceedings; and, finally, the policies 
underlying the exclusionary rule make it inapplicable to such 
proceedings. 
A-
THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP PROCEEDINGS ARE 
QUASI-CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND ARE SUBJECT TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
Appellee urges this court to hold that the proceedings 
and resulting tax and penalties described in Utah Code Annotated 
§59-19-101 et. seq. (1953, as amended) are purely civil in 
nature. Appellee first supports this position by claiming that 
taxes are imposed on other illegal activities such as 
bootlegging, gambling, extortion and fraud. Those taxes have 
been held to be civil in nature. However, the distinction 
between those situations and the illegal drug tax stamp is that 
those tax proceedings address the issue of the income derived 
from the illegal activities. Such proceedings relate to the tax 
due and owing if that same income were derived from legitimate 
means. The tax stamp assessment and penalties are based on the 
nature and quantity of the illegal substances involved. The 
nature of the activity that gives rise to the illegal drug stamp 
tax are the manufacture, production, shipment, transportation, 
importation or possession of a controlled substance. In other 
words, the drug stamp tax and penalty are not related to income. 
Rather, the tax and penalty are imposed solely on the alleged 
illegal activity. 
Appellee next argues that the test given in United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) results in the conclusion 
that tax stamp proceedings are civil in nature. The issue 
decided in Ward was whether the penalty for pollution to the 
water system was sufficiently punitive to intrude on Fifth 
Amendment protections. The court of appeals had held that the 
civil penalty statute was quasi-criminal in nature. In 
1
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1)(1953, as amended). 
concluding no Fifth Amendment protections were implicated the 
Court distinguished a forfeiture case, Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd was distinguished on the basis that 
there was no correlation between the damages sustained and the 
amount of property subject to the forfeiture. In Ward the 
penalties were correlated to the cost of cleanup of the 
pollutants. The Court also noted that a factor of critical 
importance in Boyd was that the criminal and civil sanctions were 
provided in the same statute. In Ward the civil and criminal 
statutes were enacted seventy years apart and were found in 
different statutes. 
The Court in Ward then went on to rely on a test from 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Appellee 
3 quoted the seven factors from that test but did not analyze the 
Utah illegal drug tax stamp statutes in light of those factors. 
Although not all of these factors apply to the tax stamp 
2 
Boyd was a civil forfeiture case where the Supreme Court first 
indicated that the exclusionary rule may apply to Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
3 
Brief of appellee at 7. 
-3-
statutes, several are applicable. First, a substantial 
monetary penalty for the commission of a crime, such as that 
associated with the drug tax stamp, has historically been 
regarded as a fine. A fine is obviously a form of punishment. 
Second, the acts that give rise to the tax assessment— 
manufacturing, producing, shipping, transporting, importing or 
possessing controlled substances —all require an awareness that 
can be equated to "knowledge" or "intention" as defined in the 
Those factors quoted in appellee's brief are: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as 
a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether 
its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which 
it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and [7] whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the inquiry, are all relevant to 
the inquiry and may often point in differing 
directions. [emphasis in original, footnotes 
ommitted] 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-9. 
5
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1)(1953, as amended). 
-A-
criminal code. These are traditionally regarded as "scienter" 
requirements for the commission of a crime. Third, the operation 
of the tax stamp statutes is obviously aimed at promoting 
retribution and deterrence. The extremely large amounts of money 
imposed as taxes and penalties are obviously aimed at 
discouraging people from engaging in illegal drug transactions. 
The drug stamp taxes and penalties also act as a form of 
retribution against those who break the law. Fourth, as 
previously discussed, the behavior to which these proceedings 
apply is already a crime. Finally, there is no relationship 
between the amount of the tax and penalty and civil-type damages 
that are sustained as a result of illegal drug manufacture, 
production, shipment, transportation, importation or possession. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103 (1953, as amended) defines the 
mental states required for the commission of a crime. That 
statute provides in part: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
-5-
The factors from Mendoza-Martinez, supra, indicate that 
the illegal drug tax stamp proceedings are at least quasi-
criminal in nature. Furthermore, the other factors relied upon 
in Ward are also instructive. The civil and criminal illegal 
drug stamp tax statutes were enacted at the same time. Those 
civil and criminal provisions are found under the same title and 
in the same chapter of the Utah code. Finally, the daily penalty 
provisions in Ward were found to relate to the cost of toxic 
waste clean-up. The tax and penalty under the illegal drug stamp 
tax are based on the type and quantity of drug and are 
indistinguishable from a fine. Indeed, fines under the federal 
7 
sentencing guidelines are determined in the same manner. 
Consequently, under the analysis employed in Ward the proceedings 
at issue here would be regarded as quasi-criminal in nature. 
Appellee's obvious purpose in making the argument that 
these are civil proceedings is to avoid the implications of the 
holding of One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 
Q 
(1965). In One Plymouth Sedan the Supreme Court held that civil 
forfeiture proceedings were "quasi-criminal" in nature and 
The federal sentencing reform act of 1984 established guideline 
sentencing. In drug cases, the "offense level" is determined by 
the type and quantity of the controlled substance (Guideline 
§2Dl.l(a)(3)). That "offense level" determines the range of 
applicable fines (Guideline §5E1.2(c)(3)). 
o 
The importance of that case was argued by appellant in its 
opening brief but was not cited or discussed by appellee. 
-6-
subject to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule* This was 
because the civil penalty of forfeiture could be imposed only if 
there was proof that the claimant had violated the law. The 
Court also found importance in the fact that the penalty of 
forfeiture could be substantially greater than the potential fine 
for the criminal conviction of the underlying offense. Under 
those circumstances, the court found that it was anomalous to 
exclude the evidence in the criminal proceeding, but admit that 
same evidence to prove those facts in the forfeiture proceeding. 
Applying the analysis from One Plymouth Sedan, the tax 
stamp proceedings fall into this "quasi-criminal" category. The 
tax commission must have proof that the defendant violated the 
law to be able to impose the drug stamp tax and penalty. To make 
the assessment there must also be proof that the criminal 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2)(1053, as amended) 
have been violated. Furthermore, inherent in proof of a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2)(1953, as amended) 
g 
would be proof of a criminal controlled substances offense. In 
this case the tax and penalty assessed was $394,106. The maximum 
fine and assessment for the second degree felony with which 
appellant was charged was $12,500. The tax stamp proceedings 
clearly fall within the "quasi-criminal" category described in 
One Plymouth Sedan. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule should apply to these proceedings. 
Q 
See generally, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8 (1953, as amended). 
-7-
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS 
BEEN APPLIED TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
In conjunction with this first argument advanced by 
appellee is the claim that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to civil proceedings. In making this argument, appellee first 
addresses the history and development of the exclusionary rule. 
In this discussion appellee fails to discuss several important 
cases. Appellee does not mention One Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania, supra. As previously discussed, that case applied 
the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings. The basis 
for that decision was that forfeiture is a "quasi-criminal" 
proceeding. 
The other important line of cases not mentioned by 
appellee are those dealing with administrative searches. In 
Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement was applied to health and safety 
inspections. Likewise, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), the Court held that IRS agents 
executing a levy for a jeopardy tax assessment could not enter 
the petitioner's business and seize assets and records without a 
warrant or exigent circumstances. These cases belie appellee's 
-LU
 See also; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and 
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
-8-
assertion that the protections of the Fourth Amendment have never 
been applied to civil cases. 
Appellee also listed several situations where state and 
federal courts have declined to apply the exclusionary rule. One 
commentator has listed a number of administrative hearings where 
the rule has been applied: 
Courts have held or at least assumed 
that the exclusionary rule is applicable in a 
wide variety of administrative proceedings, 
including FTC hearings to uncover 
discriminatory pricing practices, SEC 
1
 J
 Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 
530 (7th Cir. 1968); FTC v. Page, 378 F.Supp. 
1052 (N.D.Ga. 1974)(distinguishing Supreme 
court's ruling in Calandra that exclusionary 
rule not applicable to grand jury witness, as 
here n[n]o investigative proceedings will be 
interrupted by consideration of respondents' 
Fourth Amendment arguments at this point"). 
-q-
proceedings, OSHA proceedings, 
proceedings before the public utilities 
commission to terminate phone service because 
T141 of illegal use, NLRB hearings concerning 
labor controversies, immigration 
Tl2l 
L J
 OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F.Supp. 540 
(N.D.Tex. 1978); judgment aff'd, 614 F.2d 58 
(5th Cir.). 
[13] 
Savina Home Industries„ Inc. v. 
Secretary^of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 
1979)(noting that the Barlow's case, 
discussed in §10.2(a), did not resolve the 
issue because there no OSHA search had yet 
taken place). Consider also Weyerhaeuser Co. 
v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 
1979)(company can seek suppression in 
district court notwithstanding fact OSHA 
administrative proceedings still pending; 
exhaustion of administrative remedies not 
required here, "as counsel for the Secretary 
informed us at oral argument that the OSHA 
Review Commission has never ruled on the 
issue of a warrant's validity"). See also 
Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule: 
Should the Employer Go Free Because the 
Compliance Officer Has Blundered", 1981 Duke 
L.J. 667; Annot., 67 A.L.R.Fed. "724 (1984); 
Comments, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 789 (1980); 19 Wake 
Forest L.Rev. 819 (1983). 
Tl4l 
Goldin v. Public Utilities Comm., 23 
Cal.3d 638, 153 Cal.Rptr. 802, 592 P.2d 289 
(1979). 
^
15
^ NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 870 
(5th Cir. 1938). 
-i n -
hearings. *• ^ hearings to terminate a public 
[17] 
employee's government service, hearings 
to suspend or revoke a license to practice a 
U O J 
Natu 
Cir. 
Ward 
Frag 
Wonq Chunq Che 
ralization Service 
1977); 
, 24 F 
omen, 
Schenk ex 
.Supp. 776 
Procedural 
v. Imm: 
f 565 F. 
rel. Chow 
(D.Mass. 
.Aspects__ 
Lqration 
2d 166 
Fook Ho: 
1938). 
of 11 
and 
(1st 
nq v. 
See 
legal 
Search and Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 
San Diego L.Rev. 151 (1976); Annot., 44 
A.L.R.Fed. 933 (1979); Comment, 14 
U.C.Davis.L.Rev. 955 (1981); Note 58 
N.Car.L.Rev. 647 (1980). But see text at 
note 98 infra. 
[171 
1 J
 Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 
(D.C.Cir. 1966); Sullivan v. District Ct. of 
Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 429 N.E.2d 335 
(1981)("Illegally obtained evidence may not 
be used by the government in a Civil Service 
Commission proceeding to support the 
discharge of a public employee"); City of 
New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.Super. 9, 
384 A.2d 225 (1978). 
But see People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 412 
N.T.S.2d 801, 385 N.Y.S.2d 801, 385 N.E.2d 
541 (1978) (under the "length of the road" 
part of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree 
analysis used by the Supreme Court in the 
Ceccolini case, discussed in §11.4(i), the 
fact the evidence was offered in such a 
proceedings is relevant because it shows it 
is somewhat less likely that suppression is 
needed as a deterrent). 
- i i -
ri8i ri9i 
profession L J or to sell liquor l and 
hearings to suspend or expel a student from a 
public high school L J or a state [21] 
university. 
LeFave, Search and Seizure, §1.7(e) at p. 159 (1987). 
One of the cases cited by appellee, Tirado v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982), 
specifically rejected the civil-criminal distinction in the 
application of the exclusionary rule. In Tirado the court 
indicated that a number of factors must be explored to determine 
if the exclusionary rule applied to a particular proceeding. 
Those factors include: whether the officers had an interest in 
[181 
Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 
Cal.App.2d 489f 50 Cal.Rptr. 304 
(1966)(questioned in Pierce v. Board of 
Nurs i nq Educat ion, 255 Cal.App.2d 558r 63 
Cal.Rptr. 107 (1967); Yarbrouqh v. Pfeiffer, 
370 So.2d 1177 (Fla.App. 1979). 
[191 
L J
 Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor 
Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, 
249 N.E.2d 440 (1969); Leoqrande v. State 
Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 
433 (1966); Board of Comm'rs v. Pastore, 
R.I. , 463 A.2d 161 (1983). 
1 J
 Jones v. Latexo Independent School 
District, 499 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Tex. 1980); 
Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F.Supp. 835 
(N.D.Tex. 1972). 
^
21
^ Smyth v. Lubber, 389 F.Supp. 777 
(W.D.Mich.1975); Moore v. Student Affairs 
Committee of Troy State University, 284 
F.Supp. 725 (M.D.Ala. 1968). 
-12-
the proceeding at issue, if that proceeding was within the 
officers predictable contemplation, if that potential proceeding 
motivated the officers' actions, and if there was any 
understanding or collusion between the two bodies. The court in 
Tirado concluded its analysis stating, 
. . . the exclusionary rule can be properly 
and beneficially applied in those civil 
proceedings where it has a realistic prospect 
of achieving marginal deterrence. 
689 F.2d at 314. 
The bright line civil-criminal distinction urged by 
appellee fails to correctly reflect the state of the law. This 
22 
court needs to look to the nature of the proceedings or the 
23 
policies that support the exclusionary rule. As discussed in 
Point I, A., supra, these proceedings are quasi-criminal in 
nature and the exclusionary rule should apply to them. In Point 
I, C , infra, it will be shown that the policies underlying the 
exclusionary rule require that it be applied to illegal drug 
stamp tax proceedings. 
THE POLICIES THAT JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE REQUIRE ITS APPLICATION TO THE ILLEGAL 
DRUG TAX STAMP PROCEEDINGS. 
One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra. 
23
 Janis v. United States, 480 U.S. 433 (1976); INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
-13-
The exclusionary rule was originally regarded as a 
constitutional requirement that attached to Fourth Amendment 
violations. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The 
Court in Weeks found that without this remedy there would be no 
protections against Fourth Amendment violations. In Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that two policies 
justified the rule. The first justification was the need to 
deter unlawful police conduct by making the evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment inadmissible. The second 
justification was the need to preserve judicial integrity. The 
Court reasoned that the judiciary should not be in a position of 
condoning Fourth Amendment violations by admitting evidence 
seized as a result of those violations. Subsequently, in United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the court indicated that 
the exclusionary rule was a judicial remedy and its primary 
purpose was to deter law enforcement from violating the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Appellee argues that judicial integrity is not a policy 
that should be considered to justify the application of the 
exclusionary rule. There is no question that the United States 
Supreme Court has recently downplayed or even disregarded the 
importance of that policy in determining the application of the 
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984). However; this court reasserted its importance as a 
justification for the exclusionary rule in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). In Arroyo, this court stated, 
A further purpose of the exclusionary rule 
implicated here, as enunciated in Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) , is to prevent 
making a court a "party to lawless invasions 
of the constitutional rights of citizens by 
permitting unhindered governmental use of the 
fruits of such invasions." 
796 P.2d at 689. This policy of judicial integrity also prevents 
the erosion of the courts' ability to enforce individual 
liberties. 
The second purpose for the exclusionary rule is to 
deter unlawful police conduct. Appellee argues there is no 
deterrence of such conduct if the tax commission suppresses 
evidence illegally seized. Appellee first claims that the 
suppression of evidence in the criminal proceeding is sufficient 
deterrence. Second, appellee contends that the tax commission 
has no authority to control the actions of police officers. 
Third, appellee argues that the officers do not directly benefit 
from their misdeeds. Finally, appellee asserts that litigating 
search and seizure claims will be unduly burdensome to the tax 
commission and this court. 
In support of this last assertion, appellee cites INS 
v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra. In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to deportation cases. 
One of the reasons given for that holding was the burden created 
by requiring immigration judges to litigate search and seizure 
issues. Immigration judges heard a very large number of cases 
and the proceedings were relatively simple. The same thing 
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cannot be said for tax stamp proceedings. In this case appellant 
is faced with a tax liability of nearly $400,000. There were a 
number of conferences and hearings before a law-trained 
administrative law judge prior to that judge's decision being 
submitted to the tax commission for approval. Requiring that 
judge to make decisions on Fourth Amendment issues will not cause 
the same kinds of problems as would occur in the immigration 
24 hearings in Lopez-Mendoza. 
As for the question of deterrence, the critical factor 
is that the State reaps a substantial benefit from Fourth 
Amendment violations. Under the current statute, the agency 
involved in the seizure receives sixty percent of the taxes and 
25 penalty collected. If the state or the particular agency is 
able to benefit from the violation, such violations would be 
encouraged. Appellee argues that the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §59-19-105(6)(1953, as amended) were not in effect at 
the time of this stop. However, the existence of that statute 
should be a substantial factor for this court to consider in 
determining if the exclusionary rule should apply to these 
24 
Appellee contends that there may be added litigation in the 
courts, as a result of applying the exclusionary rule to the tax 
stamp proceedings. However, if the exclusionary rule does not 
apply, those who are the subjects of the tax may opt to file 
Civil Rights actions claiming Fourth Amendment violations. The 
drug stamp tax and penalty could be claimed as damages. Thus, 
the burden on our judicial system may be increased. 
2 5
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(6)(1953, as amended). 
proceedings. Appellee also claims that the tax commission is not 
in a position to effect the actions of local law enforcement. 
However, if law enforcement officers were aware that the state 
would not benefit from Fourth Amendment violations, they would 
certainly be deterred form committing those violations. 
Furthermore, when the nature of the drug tax stamp 
proceedings is considered in light of the factors discussed in 
the Tirado case, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule 
can be seen. Appellant was stopped and the drugs were found on 
July 27, 1988. (R. 153) On August 30, 1988, he was served with 
the notice and demand for payment. (R. 257-258) The 
information regarding the drug seizure was relayed to the tax 
commission by the Juab County Attorney. (R. 60) These factors 
tend to indicate that the drug stamp tax proceedings were within 
the officer's contemplation at the time of the stop. These facts 
also indicate there is some degree of collusion between the local 
law enforcement officials and the tax commission. Consequently, 
there would be a deterrent effect in applying the exclusionary 
rule to the illegal drug tax stamp proceedings before the state 
tax commission. 
POINT II 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
BE APPLIED TO ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP 
PROCEEDINGS. 
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Appellant argued in its opening brief that the 
exclusionary rule applicable to violations of Article I, Section 
26 14 of the Utah Constitution should be applied in this case. 
Appellee did not respond to this argument. In State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), this court held that there is an 
exclusionary rule for law enforcement violations of Article I, 
Section 14. This court specifically left several issues open 
with respect to that rule. The court stated, 
Thus, the significant questions which must be 
answered by state courts considering 
independent state exclusionary rules are "(1) 
whether the state courts consider the 
exclusionary rule to be a constitutional 
requirement; (2) whether state courts view 
deterrence as the only purpose behind the 
rule; and (3) which governmental officials 
are deemed to be the target of this 
deterrence." [citation ommitted] 
794 P.2d at 473. 
These issues are applicable to this case. If this 
court regards the exclusionary rule as a constitutional 
requirement rather than a judicial remedyr then the rule would 
certainly apply to any criminal or civil proceedings to which the 
government is a party. As pointed out in Larocco, several state 
courts had held prior to Mapp v. Ohio, supra, that the 
27 
exclusionary rule was a state constitutional requirement. 
See Point II. D. of appellant's opening brief. 
See, State v. Larocco, supra, at 472. 
Those decisions relied heavily on the policy that the courts 
should not be a party to the unlawful actions of police officers 
by admitting the results of those actions into evidence. State 
v. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927); Gore v. State, 24 
Okla.Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923). 
That same reasoning should be applied by this court to 
these proceedings. Evidence that was seized as a result of the 
officers' unlawful activities should not be allowed to be used in 
any manner. To allow such use, this court is condoning those 
unlawful actions. Furthermore, if the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable here, this court would allow the state to receive a 
substantial financial benefit as a result of its agents violating 
the state constitution. Consequently, this court should rule 
that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement rather 
than a judicial remedy. 
These same arguments also apply to the second issue 
discussed in Larocco, whether deterrence is the only purpose 
behind the exclusionary rule. The policy of deterrence described 
in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, should not be regarded as the only 
purpose of the state constitutional exclusionary rule. As 
previously noted, in discussing the issue of the fruits of a 
Fourth Amendment violation, this court relied on the policy of 
judicial integrity as a purpose of the exclusionary rule. State 
v. Arroyo, supra. Furthermore, refusing to acknowledge the 
importance of the judicial integrity policy would "relegate the 
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judiciary to the periphery" in the enforcement of the Fourth 
Amendment. United States v. Leon, supra, at 931 (Brennan, J.f 
dissenting). 
One commentator addressed the issue of deterrence being 
the only policy justifying the exclusionary rulef stating, 
The response to the view that the fourth 
amendment restricts only privacy violations 
by government agents who perform the actual 
invasion is that the amendment restricts 
governmental power as a whole. Thusf the 
scope of the amendment includes 
administrative, executive and judicial 
action. When a judge admits illegally 
obtained evidence, he completes the 
governmental action prohibited by the fourth 
amendment. The possession by the government 
of illegally obtained evidence is meaningless 
unless it is admitted by a trial judge. It 
is only by police and judge acting in 
concert, as evidence-gatherers and evidence-
admitter, that a constitutional violation can 
have a legal effect. Because searches and 
seizures are executed in order to bring 
"proof to the aid of the Government," and 
because such evidence is of no value unless 
admitted by a trial judge, in order for the 
fourth amendment to have any effect "police 
and the courts cannot be regarded as 
constitutional strangers to each other." The 
significance of the exclusionary rule, 
therefore, largely lies in the fact that it 
serves to protect constitutional rights 
without the need for judicial intervention. 
The threat of the exclusion of unlawfully 
obtained evidence makes enforcement of fourth 
amendment rights at least partially self-
executing, [footnotes ommitted] 
Note, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of 
State Constitution Law, 1987 Wis.L.Rev. 377 at 393-394. 
There are several other problems with the deterrence, 
cost/benefit analysis advanced in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza. The 
most important of which is the nature of the fundamental right 
that is at issue: 
The individual rights provided in the 
Constitution are among the fundamental 
principles of our system of government, and 
embody our conception of the relation of the 
individual to the government. These rights 
are vital ends in themselves, and our 
government exists in part, to protect these 
rights. Because of their fundamental nature, 
they cannot be means to more important ends. 
But recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions, by using a cost/benefit 
methodology, have subordinated these 
fundamental ends to lesser ends, such as 
administrative efficiency. Implicit in 
employing a cost/benefit analysis in 
adjudicating questions of individual rights 
lies the notion that these rights have an 
instrumental, and not fundamental, value. 
This methodology poses a danger to the future 
vitality of individual rights. The 
fundamental nature of these rights, 
therefore, should preclude use of a 
cost/benefit methodology in deciding cases 
directly concerning individuals rights, 
[footnote ommitted] 
Note, 1987 Wis.L.Rev., supra, at 394. 
The other problem with the reasoning in Janis and 
Lopez-Mendoza is that it fails to account for the changes in 
attitudes of law enforcement and the judiciary with respect to 
the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 
1988) the court refused to apply the "good faith" exception 
described in Leon to its exclusionary rule. Some of the reasons 
given were that the court felt the exclusionary rule has resulted 
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in more training for police and judges being more careful in 
scrutinizing search warrants and supporting affidavits. The 
"deterrence only" analysis of the exclusionary rule fails to 
account for these factors. Based on these factors, the benefits 
from the exclusionary rule cannot be quantified. It is 
impossible to determine how many bad searches have been avoided 
based on the change in judicial attitudes and police education. 
The third of these issues, the scope of the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule, was discussed at length in point 
I.C., supra. Those same arguments would apply to the deterrent 
effects of the exclusionary rule of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
This court should rule that the exclusionary rule of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is a 
constitutional requirement rather than a judicially created 
remedy. Furthermore, the purposes of the rule go beyond 
deterrence. Those purposes should also include the integrity of 
the judicial system and a prohibition on the state receiving 
financial benefits from violations of Article I, Section 14. 
Finally, there is a deterrent effect on the actions of law 
enforcement officers if the exclusionary rule is applied to the 
illegal drug tax stamp proceedings. Consequently, the Article I, 
Section 14 exclusionary rule should be regarded as a 
constitutional requirement and be applied to these proceedings. 
-22-
POINT III 
THE ROADBLOCK STOP WAS CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION 
OF BOTH ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Appellee refused to address the issues related to the 
28 
constitutional violations. In State v. Sims, 156 U.A.R. 8 
(Ut.App. 1991), the court of appeals reversed appellant's 
criminal conviction. That court found violations of both the 
Fourth Amendment and of Article If Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The evidence that was introduced at the 
suppression hearing in the criminal case was entered into 
evidence in this case as part of the stipulated facts. (R. 146-
213) Based on the ruling of the court of appeals, this court 
should find that the roadblock in question violated both the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should hold that the exclusionary rule is 
applicable to the proceedings before the State Tax Commission on 
the illegal drug stamp tax. This case should be remanded to the 
Tax Commission with orders that the Tax Commission apply the 
exclusionary rule and comply with the ruling on the 
constitutional violations as was determined by the court of 
appeals. 
28 
See, Brief of Appellee at p. 4. 
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